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CIA/ALA *AR 96-004*



Directorate of Intelligence

Africa Review

12 February 1996

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ALA AR 96-004
12 February 1996
Copy 264


APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: SEP 2001

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Africa Review [REDACTED]

12 February 1996

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Burundi: Denounces Proposed UN Intervention [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	1
Key Tutsi political and military leaders have denounced a UN proposal to create a standby UN military intervention force to prevent ethnic violence or a UN guard force to protect relief workers and UN personnel. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within the CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the [REDACTED] Office of African and Latin American Analysis, on [REDACTED]

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Africa Review

Articles

Burundi: Denounces Proposed UN Intervention

Burundi's Tutsi political establishment and Tutsi-dominated military are harshly critical of a UN proposal to create a UN military intervention force or a UN guard force to protect relief workers and UN personnel. [REDACTED]

A late January UN Security Council resolution calls on the Secretary General to develop contingency plans by 20 February for a UN military intervention force for Burundi. [REDACTED]

- In March 1995, the Secretary General made a similar proposal, which failed to garner international support, asking for troop contributions to an approximately 500-man force that would deploy to Bujumbura—under the Chapter VII “peacemaking” provisions of the UN charter—to check ethnic violence and to protect foreign nationals and senior Burundian political leaders. [REDACTED]

Tutsis Fear International Military Intervention...

Within hours of passage of the resolution, key Tutsi figures denounced it. Burundian Prime Minister Nduwayo issued a public statement rejecting military

intervention. [REDACTED]

Many Tutsis are convinced that their domination of the country's security services is all that stands between them and a Rwanda-style genocide and would move to prevent foreign military intervention:

- Although Nduwayo and Bikomagu recently supported beleaguered President Ntibantungya by sending forces to break the general strike by Tutsi extremists, [REDACTED] the extremists almost certainly would attempt to remove both the Prime Minister and the President if they believed significant foreign military intervention was imminent.
- Tutsi extremists also might target foreigners, hoping that casualties would force Western powers to focus on evacuating their nationals rather than on intervention, applying a tactic Hutu extremists used to scare off UNAMIR troops in Rwanda as the genocide began there in 1994.
- We have no information that the Burundian Army has prepared contingency plans to oppose foreign military intervention. Tutsi extremist elements within and outside the military, however, would

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A Mission too Far? [REDACTED]

A lightly armed UN guard force would probably be able to protect relief workers from ordinary bandits or a few Tutsi youth gang members. Current attacks, however—in which youth gangs, probably with military complicity, ambush relief convoys and harass relief workers—probably already exceed the ability of a small UN guard force to provide adequate security. Moreover, by opting for a UN guard force, relief agencies would signal that they are unable to develop a working relationship with the government, a development that Tutsi extremists would cite as evidence that the relief agencies are not neutral. [REDACTED]

A large UN intervention force could probably secure the capital and, with sufficient mobility, could restrain communal violence or keep Army-on-civilian violence from escalating. The French deployment into Rwanda in 1994, for example, is credited by some with containing the genocide in southwestern Rwanda. A UN force would almost certainly be tagged as anti-Tutsi, however, and be subject to serious harassment by elements of the military or youth gangs. Casualties would be unavoidable. Moreover, without a national political settlement, there would be no easy or clear exit for the UN intervention force. A UN proposal that combined an intervention force for internal security with measures to rein in Hutu insurgents and provide space for political negotiation might be perceived as sufficiently balanced to win wider Burundian acceptance. It probably would still be opposed by Tutsi extremists, however, and would in any event probably entail a protracted commitment of UN forces. [REDACTED]

undoubtedly view any military intervention as pro-Hutu and probably would consider targeting the foreign troops. Tutsi extremists have repeatedly threatened the US Ambassador for his alleged pro-Hutu bias and recently began attacking relief workers they believed to be supporting Hutus. [REDACTED]

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